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PRESENTATION
Building a Security Community in 
Northeast Asia: 






　There isabsolutelynodoubt that theNortheastAsianregion―
China, JapanandKorea―isgoing toproveabsolutelycritical to
globalpeaceandstability in the21stcentury.NortheastAsia is the
centerofglobaleconomicdevelopment. Ithasa landmass fifteen
percentbiggerthanallofEuropeandacombinedpopulationof1.5
billionpeopleoroverone-fifthofall thepeopleof theworld.What




relationshipsbetweenall three countries are aspositive as the




nationalism, inNortheastAsia. If thesecountrieswere to revert
topre-SecondWorldWarandpostwarconflictpatterns itwould
havemajornegative implicationsforregionalandglobalpeaceand









Asia couldbecomea regionof instability rather than stability.
TheNortheastAsian regiondoesnothaveany regional security
architectureequivalent to that inSouthEastAsiaorEurope. Ithas
maintainedreasonablelevelsofpoliticalstabilityforthepast25years
mainlybecauseofextensiveeconomic relationshipsanda range
of formaland informal relationshipsbetweenpolicymakersand
politicians inall threecountries.Thesearebeginningtogeta little
frayed in the21stcentury.Emerging incompatibilitiesmeans that
insteadoffocusingonwaysinwhichsecurityissuescanbeaddressed
collaboratively and cooperatively therehasbeen a resurgence





　The election or ( inChina ’s case) selection of conservative
nationalist leaders inJapan,SouthKoreaandChinahasgenerated
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additional instabilityaseachcountry tries tomake senseof the
shiftingdynamicsandpower transitions takingplace in theregion.
All three countries are in transition.Despite a slowdown in its
economicgrowth,Chinaistheworld’sfastestrisingeconomicpower.




convergent there isareasonable likelihoodofpeaceandstability.
When they start to diverge the probability of political and/or
economicstabilitydiminishes.WhileChina,JapanandKoreahave
relativelyrobusteconomicsystemsall threepoliticalsystemsoften
seemprecariousand lackdeeppopular legitimacy.This senseof
political fragilityhascontributed towardsanupsurgeof identity
politicsinNorthEastAsiawhichmeansthatNortheastAsianforeign
policiesarebeingdrivenbyacomplexcombinationofdomestic
aswell as external dynamics.Nationalist identity politics have
beendrivenbyrulingelites inChina,JapanandKoreawanting to
consolidate theirpowerandauthority inorder toboostpopular
support,grapplewithcorruptionandpolitical fragilityandmaintain
domesticintegration.
　Themajorgeo-political resultof thesedomesticand triangular
dynamicsisthatChinaismovingclosertoSouthKoreawhileJapan
is going in theopposite direction. The very successful summit
betweenPresident’sXiJinpingandParkGeun-hyeinBeijinginJune
2013, forexample,wasnot reflected ina similar summitbetween









upbyarangeofparliamentarydelegations to tryand thawfrosty
relationsbetweenbothcountries.Theupshotofall thesedifferent
processes is thatChina-Japan-Korean relationshipshavebecome
moreincompatibleandtense.
　While therehavebeenmanydiplomaticefforts toaddress the




Abe’s commentswere less fulsome than thosemadebyPrime
MinisterMurayamaontheoccasionof the50thanniversaryanddid
notsatisfytheChineseorKoreangovernments.









　Manyof the issues thathavebeenaddressed in theSymposium,
forexample, suchasNorthKorea’snuclearweaponsandmissile
programme;China’smaritimeassertiveness;Japan’sreinterpretation
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of itsPacifistConstitutionanddesire tobecomea“normal”nation,
areallpresentingrather thanunderlyingproblems.WhatIwant to
argueinthispaper is that thesepresentingproblemsaresymptoms




largelybecauseof a joint commitment toeconomicgrowthand
development,awillingness toplacateUSstrategic interestsanda
desiretocoexistwithoutraisinguncomfortablequestionsaboutpast
painfulhistory. In thepast10 years,however,as the leaderships
ofChina, Japan andKorea have advocated strong nationalist
sentiments; andxenophobic feelingsabouteachother therehas










issuesbuta strangeneuralgiaaboutdeveloping regional security
architecture. Iwasactively involvedwithCanadiancolleagues, for
example,inarangeofNortheastAsianconversationsonconfidence
building,armscontrolanddisarmamentandthepeacefulresolution
of conflicts in the 1990sbutwemade littleprogress.Therewas
awillingnesson thepartofChina, JapanandKorea, todeepen
60





　In the1990s to theearly2000s, for example, theROK reached
outeconomically to theDPRKandChina joined theWorldTrade
Organisationarguingthatitsprimarypurposewasa“apeacefulrise”





Koreaalso tookplace in this immediatepostwarperiod.Themost
importantoutcomeofall theseeconomic initiativeswas thatChina
becamethenumberonedestinationforforeigndirectinvestmentand
exportsfrombothJapanandSouthKorea.
　Noneof this cooperation eliminated conflict however,North
Koreaconducteditsfirstmissileandnucleartests;ChinaandTaiwan





1 StephanHaggard, “TheLiberalViewof the InternationalRelationsof
Asia,”inSaadiaPekkanen,JohnRavenhillandRosemaryFoot(eds.)The 
Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia.(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,2014)pp.45-63Robert.O.Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy. (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press.1984); JohnR.OnealandBruceRussett, “ClearandClean:The
FixedEffectsoftheLiberalPeace.”International Organization(Spring,2001)
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　Thelast10years,however,haveseenaveryrapidriseininterstate
competitionand rivalry.Thishasmanifested itself in expensive
militarymodernizationandconflictsover a varietyofmaritime
sovereignty claims.China’s 2015 declarationof anAirDefense
IdentificationZone (ADIZ) in areas underROK and Japanese
administrativecontroland its recentdevelopmentofseveral reefs
in theSouthChinaSeas toadvance its9Dash lineclaimhavenot
boostedregionalcooperationandconfidence.Similarly theDPRK’s








ofeconomicdifferencesover things like theAsian Infrastructure
InvestmentBankdevelopedbyChinaandtheTPPdevelopedbythe
USanditsallies.Butwhatmakesallofthese“events”andincidents
toxic is that theyhave increasinglybeen linked tocontestedand




governedrelationshipsbetween thedifferent statesover thepast
thirtyyears.Thesecordialrelationsareunderthreatat themoment
becausepolitical leaders inChina,Japan, theROK,DPRK,Russia
Vol.LV,No.2.Pp.469-485.
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and theUnitedStatesareall trying to satisfy largeandgrowing
numbersofcitizenswho feeleconomically, socialandpolitically
excludedfromthebenefitsoftheirparticularpoliticalandeconomic
systems.Nationalism isaneasywayof responding togeneralized
social,economicandpolitical fears,anxietiesand insecuritiesand
as integrated threat theorysuggests itcananddoesboost internal
integrationovertheshortterm.
　Iwant toargue,however, thatnationalism isoneof themost
significant challenges to thedevelopmentof an intentional co-














example, launched“patrioticeducation” in the1990s.Thisactivated
2  SuishengChao, “AState-ledNationalism: ThePatriotic Education
CampaigninPost-TiananmenChina,Communist and Post-Communist Studies,
(March,1998)Vol.31,No.3,pp.287?302;Chung-InMoonandSeung-
WonSuh,“IdentityPolitics,Nationalism,and theFutureofNortheast
AsianOrder,” inG.JohnIkenberryandChung-InMoon,eds.,The United 
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4  Chung-InMoon and Seung-Won Suh, op. cit., p. 208. As cited in
Atanassova-Cornelia,op.cit.p.173.





Japan Security alliance even if this somewhat contradicts the
nationalistimpulsesofmanyofhissupporters.
　“Abenomics”andAbe’sforeignpolicyhaveprecipitatedwidespread
civilsocietyopposition inJapanbut thepoliticalopposition to the
LDP/Komeitocoalitionremainsweakandsofarincapableofresisting
thesenewmilitarizing trends.WhenJapanreasserts its territorial




e.gconflictsover fishing rights,arrestsof Japanesebusinessmen
inChina, theyhavegeneratedmegaphonic responses andboth
organisedandspontaneousnationalistprotestsinJapanandChina.











generatedamorehardlineKoreanandJapanese response to the
DPRK.PresidentLeewas in favourof regionaldialoguesbetween
Russia,China,JapanandKoreahewasambivalentandantagonistic
toNorthKorea.
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for its nuclearweapon andmissile development. In particular












history in order to absolve the Japanese government for any


















militarization ( both conventional andnuclear)with economic
developmentandgrowth.Theonlyway inwhich theNorthcan




　When the 6 party talks hit an impasse in 2008, for example,
themilitaryhardliners tookover in theDPRK justas theydid in













8  AlexandreMansourov, “North Korea: Leadership Schisms and
ConsolidationDuringKimJongUn’sSecondYear inPower,”38 North
availableathttp://38north.org/2014/01/amansourov012214
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community thatwillguaranteestablepeace.This isan imperative




　Inorder toclear theway for this tohappen leaders inall four





























forwhomthis is importanthasgrownfrom35.5%in2014 tonearly
48%lastyear.Astheyearsrecedeandthedirectparticipantsdiethe
painfulmemories inChinaare intensifying.But thepublic inboth
countriesaredeeplysuspiciousoftheotherandpessimisticaboutthe
future.
　It ishistoryIssues,a lackof trustandindifferenceto the identity
needsof theother thataredriving theantagonismbetweenChina
andJapan.60%ofJapanesepeoplemistrust theChinese>40%of
Chinesemistrust theJapanese.Thismistrust isdriven inpartby
territorialdisputesbutmainlyunresolvedhistory issues. It is the
70
unwillingnessofeither side toacknowledge the identityneedsof





is toself, then identificationwith thatgroupornationbecomesa
sourceof individualprideandself-esteem.Taken toextreme this
oftenresultsinthexenophobicnationalismthatweseeinNortheast








and “chosen trauma”whilebuildingaglorious future. Inresponse
10　(Tajfel&Turner,1986)
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Japan introduces itsown “ChosenTraumas”.Hiroshima,Nagasaki
andtheTokyoincendiaryraids .Theseareusefulremindersof the
inhumanityofsuchweaponsandsuchtacticsbuttheyarealsoused








will alwaysbe fraught.Thecompetitivevictimhooddynamic, for
example,gets translated intoacompetition fornumberonestatus.
PrimeMinisterAbeasserts that “Japan isnotandwillneverbea
tier twocountry.That is thecoremessageI’mhere tomake,andI
shouldrepeat itbysaying IambackandsoshallJapanbe.”Abe
andHyakutatogetherhavesaid“‘Japan!Beproudofyourselfinthe
Centerof theWorld..And inAugust2014,Abeasserted that those
executedby theAlliedPowersare “the foundationof thenation”
andshouldbehailed forhaving “staked theirsouls tobecomethe
foundationoftheirnationsothatJapancouldachievethepeaceand
prosperityoftoday”
　This iscountered inChinabyPresidentXiJinPingstating that
Chinahasadreamtoo.ThisishisChineseDream.“Thisdreamcan
besaid tobe thedreamofastrongnation.Andfor themilitary, it
isadreamofastrongmilitary,” …“Toachieve thegreatrevival




in the1930sand1940s.This isviewedasapre-requisite forChinese
strengthinthe21stcentury.
　ForAbe thepolitical is deeplypersonal.Hewishes to revisit
Japanesewarhistoryand revoke thepostwar settlementwhich
heseesasvictor’s justice.Healsowants tochangeArticle9of the
Constitution,RemilitariseJapansothatitisseenasa“normal“nation





rectitude. Xi Jinpingwants personal acknowledgement from
Abeof Japanese responsibility for thewar.AbewantsChinese
acknowledgementof Japanesewartime sufferingandanend to
repeated requests forapology.74.1%of theChinesepolledwere
dissatisfiedwithAbe’sstatementonthe70thanniversaryof theEnd






　The fact is that therearedivergentviewsonhow todealwith
painfulhistory.47%ofChinese (Upfrom31.4%in2014)believethat
“ChinaJapanrelationswillnotdevelopunless thehistorical issues
are resolved.35.5%ofJapanesepolled think itwillbe impossible
to resolve thehistory issuesuntil there isan improvement in the
relationshipsbetweenbothcountries.So there isan impasse.My
argument ,basedonaseriesofproblemsolvingworkshops that I




















the “rapeofNanjing,” inhumanetreatmentofprisonersofwar, the




since theSecondWorldWarand the Japanesegovernmentand







of theapology.Forexample theJapaneseForeignMinistry issued
thisstatementin2005.
12
“Duringacertainperiodof thepast,Japan followedamistaken 
national policy and caused tremendous damage and suf fering to the people 
of many countries, particularly to those Asian nations, through its colonial 
rule and aggression.Japansquarely faces these facts of history in a spirit 
of humility. With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always
engraved inmind,Japan,underpinnedby itssoliddemocracy,
has resolutelyandconsistently strived forpeacebyadhering
toastrictlydefensivesecuritypolicy,preventing theescalation
of internationalconflict,anddedicating itself to international
peaceandstabilitybymobilizingallitsresources…Aftertheend
ofWorldWar II, Japanrenouncedall rights, titlesandclaims
toKorea,Taiwan, theKurile islands,aportionofSakhalin,and
otherterritories,andacceptedthejudgmentsoftheInternational
MilitaryTribunal of theFarEast (TokyoTrial), inwhich 25
Japaneseleadershadbeenconvictedofwarcrimes.Manyother
Japanesewereconvicted inotherwarcrimescourts. Japan has 
dealt with the issues of reparations, property and claims, in accordance with 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the bilateral peace treaties, agreements and 
instruments. Japan paid reparations to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam, while others waived them.After thenormalizationof its
relationswiththeRepublicofKorea,Chinaandothercountries,
Japan extended a substantial amount of economic cooperation. With the parties 
to these documents, the issues of reparations, property and claims, including the 
claims by individuals, have been settled legally(MinistryofForeignAffairs
2005,citedinSeaton2007,66).
12　(Seaton,2007)
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　TheapologieswhichChinaandKoreahavefeltmorecomfortable
with have been personal and heart felt. HosokawaMorihito,
for examplemademore than fourofficial apologies for Japan’s









heartfeltapology (kokorokaranoowabi )”YoheiKono’sapology in
KoreaforComfortwomenin1993wasofasimilarorder.
　Theproblemswiththesespecificapologiesistheywereconsidered
personal rather than political-from the Left rather than the
mainstreamRight-Instrumental rather thanheartfelt-but theywere
neverthelessacceptedinSeoulandBeijinginthespiritwithinwhich
theyweregiven.Over thepast15years (apart fromthebriefSDP
interegnum)therehasbeenadramaticrightwingshift inJapanese
politics.Fromthe1980s tonow.Apologies,expressionsofremorse
havebeenundercut bymultiplePrimeMinisterial visits to the
YasukuniShrineandbyadesirethatJapanrevisititswarhistory,the
postwarsettlementandbecomea“normalnation”again.
　Japancanonlypersuade itsneighboursabout its sincerityand
address thispainfulhistory if it canestablish itsharmlessness to
them.Itcannotdothiswhenit is intenton“normalising”andwhen









.This ischallengingbecauseofunmet identityneeds inall three
countries.Chinafeelsthatitsvictimisationandhumiliationhasnever




　Moral Imagination is critical to transforming Sino-Japanese







trustbetweeneachother for the future.Unfortunately theseare in
short supply inNortheastAsia-buthave tobediscoveredquickly






　Ofone thingwecanbesure. It isonlyafter thispainfulhistory
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hasbeenputtorestthateachcountrywillbeabletotrusttheother
enough toboost confidencebetween their respectivemilitaries;
generate higher levels of political cooperation and create the
transparent communicationsnecessary togeneratingawareness
of theothersbenign intentions.Therewillbenoprospectofmuch
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